backport fixes to releases-v5 (#2523)

__test__/input-helper.test.ts

@@ -12,15 +12,24 @@ const gitHubWorkspace = path.resolve('/checkout-tests/workspace')
 // Inputs for mock @actions/core
 let inputs = {} as any
 
+// Replicate @actions/core getInput behavior: it trims whitespace by default
+// (String.prototype.trim(), which strips characters such as a leading U+FEFF BOM)
+// unless trimWhitespace is explicitly set to false.
+const getInputImpl = (name: string, options?: {trimWhitespace?: boolean}) => {
+  const val = inputs[name] ?? ''
+  if (options && options.trimWhitespace === false) {
+    return val
+  }
+  return typeof val === 'string' ? val.trim() : val
+}
+
 // Shallow clone original @actions/github context
 let originalContext = {...github.context}
 
 describe('input-helper tests', () => {
   beforeAll(() => {
     // Mock getInput
-    jest.spyOn(core, 'getInput').mockImplementation((name: string) => {
+    jest.spyOn(core, 'getInput').mockImplementation(getInputImpl as any)
-      return inputs[name]
-    })
 
     // Mock error/warning/info/debug
     jest.spyOn(core, 'error').mockImplementation(jest.fn())
@@ -141,8 +150,76 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => {
     expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
   })
 
+  it('does not reclassify a ref as sha when a BOM is prefixed', async () => {
+    // A fork branch named "<U+FEFF>" + 40 hex chars. core.getInput trims the
+    // BOM by default, which previously collapsed this into a bare SHA and
+    // bypassed the unsafe fork PR checkout guard.
+    inputs.ref = '\uFEFF522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2'
+    const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
+    expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
+    expect(settings.ref).toBe('522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2')
+  })
+
+  it('treats a sha surrounded by ascii whitespace as a commit', async () => {
+    // ASCII whitespace can only come from the workflow author's YAML (git ref
+    // names cannot contain it), so trimming it and treating the value as a
+    // commit is safe.
+    inputs.ref = '  1111111111222222222233333333334444444444  '
+    const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
+    expect(settings.ref).toBeFalsy()
+    expect(settings.commit).toBe('1111111111222222222233333333334444444444')
+  })
+
   it('sets workflow organization ID', async () => {
     const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
     expect(settings.workflowOrganizationId).toBe(123456)
   })
+
+  describe('unsafe PR checkout guard', () => {
+    const forkPayload = {
+      repository: {id: 100},
+      pull_request: {
+        head: {
+          sha: '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890',
+          repo: {id: 200, full_name: 'attacker/fork'}
+        },
+        merge_commit_sha: 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
+      }
+    }
+
+    it('allows the default self-checkout on a fork pull_request_target', async () => {
+      const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
+      const originalPayload = github.context.payload
+      const originalSha = github.context.sha
+      try {
+        github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
+        github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
+        // Simulate a rebase/fast-forward merge where the base tip (event SHA)
+        // equals the PR head SHA. The default self-checkout must still succeed.
+        github.context.sha = '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890'
+        const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
+        expect(settings.commit).toBe('1234567890123456789012345678901234567890')
+      } finally {
+        github.context.eventName = originalEvent
+        github.context.payload = originalPayload
+        github.context.sha = originalSha
+      }
+    })
+
+    it('refuses an explicit fork repository on pull_request_target', async () => {
+      const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
+      const originalPayload = github.context.payload
+      try {
+        github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
+        github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
+        inputs.repository = 'attacker/fork'
+        await expect(inputHelper.getInputs()).rejects.toThrow(
+          /Refusing to check out fork pull request code/
+        )
+      } finally {
+        github.context.eventName = originalEvent
+        github.context.payload = originalPayload
+      }
+    })
+  })
 })

dist/index.js

@@ -1895,6 +1895,23 @@ function getInputs() {
             `${github.context.repo.owner}/${github.context.repo.repo}`.toUpperCase();
         // Source branch, source version
         result.ref = core.getInput('ref');
+        // core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
+        // leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
+        // a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
+        // be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
+        // guard.
+        //
+        // The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
+        // in a git branch name.
+        //   \t  U+0009  horizontal tab   - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+        //   \n  U+000A  line feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+        //   \v  U+000B  vertical tab     - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+        //   \f  U+000C  form feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+        //   \r  U+000D  carriage return  - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+        //   ' ' U+0020  space            - forbidden in ref names
+        const asciiTrimmedRef = core
+            .getInput('ref', { trimWhitespace: false })
+            .replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '');
         if (!result.ref) {
             if (isWorkflowRepository) {
                 result.ref = github.context.ref;
@@ -1907,8 +1924,8 @@ function getInputs() {
             }
         }
         // SHA?
-        else if (result.ref.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
+        else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
-            result.commit = result.ref;
+            result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef;
             result.ref = '';
         }
         core.debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`);
@@ -1986,12 +2003,19 @@ function getInputs() {
             (core.getInput('allow-unsafe-pr-checkout') || 'false').toUpperCase() ===
                 'TRUE';
         core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`);
-        unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
+        // The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
-            qualifiedRepository,
+        // resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
-            ref: result.ref,
+        // the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
-            commit: result.commit,
+        // repository or ref.
-            allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
+        const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref');
-        });
+        if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
+            unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
+                qualifiedRepository,
+                ref: result.ref,
+                commit: result.commit,
+                allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
+            });
+        }
         return result;
     });
 }

src/input-helper.ts

@@ -59,6 +59,23 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
 
   // Source branch, source version
   result.ref = core.getInput('ref')
+  // core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
+  // leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
+  // a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
+  // be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
+  // guard.
+  //
+  // The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
+  // in a git branch name.
+  //   \t  U+0009  horizontal tab   - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+  //   \n  U+000A  line feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+  //   \v  U+000B  vertical tab     - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+  //   \f  U+000C  form feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+  //   \r  U+000D  carriage return  - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
+  //   ' ' U+0020  space            - forbidden in ref names
+  const asciiTrimmedRef = core
+    .getInput('ref', {trimWhitespace: false})
+    .replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '')
   if (!result.ref) {
     if (isWorkflowRepository) {
       result.ref = github.context.ref
@@ -72,8 +89,8 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
     }
   }
   // SHA?
-  else if (result.ref.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
+  else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/)) {
-    result.commit = result.ref
+    result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef
     result.ref = ''
   }
   core.debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`)
@@ -168,12 +185,19 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
     'TRUE'
   core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`)
 
-  unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
+  // The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
-    qualifiedRepository,
+  // resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
-    ref: result.ref,
+  // the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
-    commit: result.commit,
+  // repository or ref.
-    allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
+  const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref')
-  })
+  if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
+    unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
+      qualifiedRepository,
+      ref: result.ref,
+      commit: result.commit,
+      allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
+    })
+  }
 
   return result
 }